Who could tell us apart? Who would be left to tell us apart? : Thinking the Unthinkable on the 70th Anniversary (特集 戦後70年 : 過去から未来へのメッセージ) by KUZNTCK Peter
Who could tell us apart? Who would be left to
tell us apart? : Thinking the Unthinkable on












“Who could tell us apart? 
Who would be left to tell us apart?”:
Thinking the Unthinkable on the 
70th Anniversary
KUZNICK Peter1)
The 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki has come and gone in the United States with disappoint-
ingly little fanfare, certainly not nearly as much as these tragic and 
cataclysmic events deserve. It was only 16 years ago that the experts 
assembled by the Newseum in Washington, DC voted the atomic 
bombings the most important news event of the 20th century. But, 
once again, the mainstream U.S. media coverage has, for the most 
part, done little to educate the American public about the real mean-
ing of the atomic bombings and what they should tell us about the 
damage the United States was and remains willing to infl ict in order 
to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As a result, most Americans, 
like most Japanese, still know little of the real history of end of the 
Pacifi c War as their knowledge is distorted by erroneous or at best 
partial accounts offered in school textbooks, movies, and television 
presentations.
The official narrative, which has been promulgated for seventy 
years, remains largely unchallenged. According to that narrative, 
dropping the atomic bombs was a necessary and ultimately humane 
act. If they had not been dropped, we are told, the United States 
would have invaded Japan and the results would have been night-
marish. President Harry Truman reaffi rmed the assertions of science 
advisor Karl Compton and Secretary of War Henry Stimson that 
U.S. casualties would have been astronomical. In his 1955 memoirs, 
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Truman claimed that General George Marshall predicted that a half 
million U.S. lives would have been lost in an invasion. Given that 
that was more than had been lost by the U.S. in the entire war to 
that point, the numbers were frightening. Although the basis for that 
assertion has never been found and Marshall’s own calculations actu-
ally placed the total at a small fraction of that estimate, there is no 
doubt that an invasion would have been costly. In subsequent years, 
defenders of the atomic bombings would also point to the millions of 
Japanese who would likely have perished in an invasion and even the 
numbers of other Asians suffering and dying under Japan’s brutal 
colonization. This reasoning has resonated most with older Americans, 
who have heard such justifi cations repeated for 70 years.
When I make public presentations about the atomic bombings, 
often coupled with screenings of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki episode of 
The Untold History of the United States, the documentary fi lm series 
(and book) that I co-authored with fi lmmaker Oliver Stone, I begin 
by asking audiences whether they think Truman’s decision to drop 
the atomic bombs was the right one. College students, especially those 
who are knowledgeable about the subject, are almost always opposed 
to use of the bombs, sometimes overwhelmingly so. But that is not 
the case with older Americans. When I asked a group of 80 and 90 
year olds at a senior assisted living center this past summer how many 
thought Truman did the right thing, hands of 26 of the 27 people in 
the room immediately shot into the air. That response might have 
been a little extreme, but it is not totally out of line for members of 
the World War II generation, especially the veterans themselves who 
are overwhelmingly convinced that Truman saved their lives by using 
atomic bombs to preempt the invasion.
That this idea has taken such hold is understandable given the 
widespread belief that the Japanese were planning to fi ght to the bit-
ter end rather than surrender. There is an eerie similarity between 
today’s depictions of fanatical Islamists and yesterday’s depictions of 
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fanatical Japanese. Both irrationally clung to and were motivated by 
their perverse religions. Both would fi ght to the death rather than 
surrender, fi nding their reward in death rather than life. Both were 
capable of inconceivable levels of viciousness, including not only the 
wholesale rape of female victims but delight in beheading of male 
captives. But it was the cruelty and single-minded devotion to their 
cause that made them most different than us—the Americans and 
some, though obviously not all, Europeans.
The Associated Press conveyed the impressions of an 18 year old 
Marine who saw combat in Iwo Jima. According to the reporter, the 
marine viewed the Japanese as “fanatical, brutal animals with no re-
spect for life.” “The Japanese exhibited no compassion,” the marine 
refl ected. “We saw them as the terrorists of the time.”
This fanatical terrorist mindset proved that rational appeals were 
pointless and only overwhelming force—the invasion or the bomb—
would induce surrender. Given the alternatives of sacrifi cing a half 
million American lives or dropping a couple atomic bombs, the rea-
soning goes, Truman had no choice. As Washington Post columnist 
Richard Cohen put it, “What could Truman have said to Americans 
who lost a loved one in an invasion of the Japanese home islands if 
they knew he had a weapon that could have ended the war and not 
used it? What, in the dead of night when sleep did not come and he 
stared at the ceiling, could he have said to the American dead? I 
chose Japanese lives over yours? Truman did what he had to do. No 
apology is needed.”
In a certain warped universe, Cohen’s logic is impeccable. Privileg-
ing American lives over Japanese lives in wartime makes perfect sense. 
It is his facts that are wrong and his moral context that is lacking. 
Like most Americans, Cohen believes the time-honored myth that the 
atomic bombs forced Japan’s surrender and ended World War II. 
Americans have clung doggedly to this comforting perception for 70 
years and have done an admirable job of not letting the facts stand in 
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the way of their convictions.
In reality, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, which began at mid-
night on August 8, had far more to do with forcing Japanese leaders 
to surrender than did the atomic bombs. The United States had been 
firebombing Japanese cities on a regular basis since March. The 
number of cities attacked, we now know from Yuki Tanaka, was ac-
tually more than 100. Even before Japan had attacked at Pearl Har-
bor, U.S. leaders had decided on a policy of burning Japanese cities 
to the ground. On November 15, 1941, Army Chief of Staff General 
George Marshall informed seven senior journalists of U.S. plans to 
fi rebomb Japan in the event of war. According to the summary pre-
pared by Time Magazine’s military affairs correspondent, Marshall said 
that “if war with the Japanese does come, we’ll fi ght mercilessly. Fly-
ing fortresses will be dispatched immediately to set the paper cities of 
Japan on fi re. There won’t be any hesitation about bombing civil-
ians—it will be all-out.” Four days later, he ordered his staff to in-
vestigate plans for “general incendiary attacks to burn up the wood 
and papers structures of the densely populated Japanese cities.” Al-
though the onslaught from the air was delayed, it proceeded along the 
lines Marshall laid out. Destruction reached a frightening 99.5 percent 
in the city of Toyama. Others were not far behind as Japanese cities 
were turned into veritable infernos in what Brigadier General Bonner 
Fellers called it “one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of 
non-combatants in all history.”
American indifference to the Japanese people’s suffering was more 
than matched by the cruelty of Japan’s own leaders. U.S. fi rebombing 
of  Japanese cities had done little to persuade them to end the war. 
Nor had widespread hunger and other miseries infl icted on the peo-
ple. Incredibly, the atomic bombings, while impactful, did little to 
change the thinking of Japanese leaders who already accepted that the 
U.S. could wipe out their cities almost at will. Whether it was one 
plane and one bomb or 200 planes and thousands of bombs seemed 
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to make little difference. Even Japanese Army Minister Korechika 
Anami’s erroneous report to the Cabinet on August 9 following the 
Nagasaki bombing that the U.S. had 100 more atomic bombs and the 
next target was Tokyo changed no one’s mind when it came to sur-
render. Some Japanese leaders expressed a willingness to sacrifice 
almost the entire population if that would forestall capitulation and all 
that entailed, including the likely execution of the emperor.
But most Japanese leaders not only rejected the thought of com-
mitting national suicide, they were aware that the empire’s days were 
numbered. Following defeat in the Battle of Saipan in July 1944, 
most understood that military victory, in the traditional sense, was 
beyond reach. In February 1945, Prince Fumimaro Konoe broke the 
bad news to the Emperor. “I regret to say,” he wrote, “that Japan’s 
defeat is inevitable.” He added, revealingly, “we should not be wor-
ried about defeat itself. What we must worry about is a Communist 
revolution that might accompany defeat.”
Tied to this fear of communism, what Japanese leaders most 
dreaded was invasion by the Soviet Union’s mighty Red Army, which 
had just, in Winston Churchill’s words, “tore the guts” out of Nazi 
forces. Little more than a week after German surrender, in May 1945, 
Japan’s Supreme War Council stated, “At the present moment, when 
Japan is waging a life-or-death struggle against the U.S. and Britain, 
Soviet entry into the war will deal a death blow to the Empire.” Con-
ditions only worsened over the next few months. Allied intelligence, 
having long since broken Japanese codes and regularly intercepted 
Japanese cables, understood that most Japanese leaders had seen the 
handwriting on the wall and were looking for an “honorable” way to 
end the war. The July 6 top secret report on the “Estimate of the 
Enemy Situation” for the Combined Chiefs of Staff detailed the des-
peration of the Japanese situation and stated unambiguously, “An 
entry of the Soviet Union into the war would fi nally convince the 
Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat.” Japan’s cable traffi c 
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back and forth between offi cials in Tokyo and Moscow fortifi ed this 
conviction. American policymakers stated so repeatedly throughout 
July. Truman himself characterized the intercepted July 18 cable as 
the “telegram from the Jap emperor asking for peace.” Truman was 
also well aware that the Soviet invasion would deliver the fatal blow 
to Japan’s war effort.
At Potsdam, prior to receiving the offi cial report on how powerful 
the atomic bomb tested at Alamogordo on July 16 really was, Tru-
man seemed to exult over Stalin’s reassurance that the Soviets, as 
promised at Yalta, were coming into the war in early August: “He’ll 
be in the Jap War on August 15,” Truman wrote. “Fini Japs when 
that comes about.” He conveyed the good news to his wife the fol-
lowing day: “We’ll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the 
kids who won’t be killed!”
Truman knew that the atomic bombs were not necessary to end the 
war. He chose to use them for other reasons—primarily to make clear 
to the Soviets the fate that lay ahead for them if they interfered with 
U.S. plans in Europe or Asia.
The Soviet invasion proved to be the game changer that Ameri-
cans, Japanese, and Soviets all knew it would be as the Red Army cut 
Japan’s once-powerful Kwantung Army to shreds. When asked on 
August 11 why Japan must surrender so quickly, Prime Minister 
Kantaro Suzuki responded that if Japan delayed, “the Soviet Union 
will take not only Manchuria, Korea, Karafuto, but also Hokkaido. 
This would destroy the foundation of Japan. We must end the war 
when we can deal with the United States.” Japanese leaders shared 
Prince Konoe’s fear that the Soviet invasion would trigger a popular 
communist uprising. They preferred to take their chances with the 
capitalist United States.
One could provide lots of evidence that the Soviet invasion—not 
the atomic bombings—induced Japanese surrender. But perhaps the 
most startling is the display at the offi cial National Museum of the U. 
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S. Navy in Washington, DC, which minces no words in stating that 
the atomic bombings “made little impact on the Japanese military. 
However, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August—fulfi lling a 
promise at the Yalta Conference in February—changed their minds.” 
Perhaps the Navy’s historians were aware that six of America’s seven 
fi ve-star admirals and generals who earned their fi fth star during the 
war—MacArthur, Eisenhower, Leahy, Nimitz, King, and Arnold—
are on record stating the atomic bombings were militarily unneces-
sary, morally reprehensible, or both.
That these facts remain so little known by the general U.S. public 
is a sad refl ection of the state of historical ignorance plaguing the 
country. But perhaps even more troubling is the fact that well-in-
formed and presumably well-meaning people are unaware of this real-
ity and continue to mislead the American people.
In November 2015, the National Parks Service offi cially confi rmed 
that the U.S. government would be establishing the Manhattan Proj-
ect National Historical Park with units at Los Alamos, Hanford, and 
Oak Ridge. Two respected cabinet members—Secretary of the Inte-
rior Sally Jewell and Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz made the an-
nouncement. Secretary Moniz promised that the park “will provide 
the platform for our citizenry to understand the roots of [the na-
tional scientifi c laboratories that emerged from the Manhattan Project] 
and what it means for our future responsibilities.” According to Sec-
retary Jewell, who appeared to be deeply moved by the plight of the 
bombs’ victims, the bomb “did mark the end of the war, but it left 
devastation in its wake.”
Despite Jewell’s protestations to the contrary, the bombs not only 
did NOT “mark the end of the war,” they marked the beginning of 
something even more horrifying—the threatened extinction of all life 
on our planet. These profoundly disturbing truths get lost in almost 
all the 70th anniversary commemorative events. But they are abso-
lutely crucial to assessing the consequences of the use of atomic 
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bombs seven decades ago. That existential threat has in no sense 
abated. And what is most signifi cant in judging the actions of Tru-
man and advisors like Brigadier General Leslie Groves and Secretary 
of State James Byrnes who encouraged the bombs’ use against Japan 
is that they were aware of the apocalyptic implications before they 
unleashed these weapons upon the world. Truman mentioned on at 
least three occasions that the weapons he was about to utilize were not 
just more powerful bombs but monstrosities that augured complete 
destruction. As he said at Potsdam after receiving the full briefi ng on 
the immense, almost indescribable, destruction wrought by the Trin-
ity test, this was no normal bomb. It was “the most terrible bomb in 
the history of the world. It may be the fi re destruction prophesied in 
the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.” In late 
May, Los Alamos laboratory director Robert Oppenheimer had 
warned military and political leaders that within three years, the U.S. 
would likely have weapons up to 7,000 times as powerful as the bomb 
dropped on Hiroshima. He was a little premature, but, in 1954, sci-
entists actually testified about the possibility of building weapons 
700,000 times the potency of the Hiroshima bomb.
Soviet leaders responded exactly as U.S. scientists predicted they 
would—by starting their own crash program. They knew through 
their own contacts with Japanese diplomats that there was no military 
need for dropping atomic bombs on a country that was about to sur-
render and concluded that their own country, even more than Japan, 
was the intended target. The warning from the United States was 
clear—obstruct U.S. postwar plans in Europe or Asia and you will 
suffer the same fate as the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but on 
a far larger scale. As the atomic bombings indicated, the U.S. would 
be unrestrained in the kind of violence it was willing to unleash to 
achieve its goals. The dreaded nuclear arms race was soon on. In a 
couple decades, nuclear arsenals would reach the 70,000 mark world-
wide. Humanity has hung on by a thread and still clings by its fi n-
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gertips to the future. As physicist I. I. Rabi observed prophetically, 
“Suddenly the day of judgment was the next day and has been ever 
since.”
But these two messages—that the atomic bomb didn’t end the Pa-
cifi c War and that in using them the U.S. knowingly opened the door 
to ending all life on the planet—were not conveyed by the offi cial 
commemorative events or, with few exceptions, the mainstream media 
coverage. Some of us, however, did everything we could to challenge 
the dominant narrative.
At American University, we held a major exhibit to commemorate 
the 70th anniversary. It was, to the best of my knowledge, the biggest 
exhibit on the atomic bombings ever held in the United States. At its 
core were six powerful Hiroshima Panels painted by acclaimed Japa-
nese artists Toshi and Iri Maruki and permanently on display at the 
Maruki Gallery in Saitama, Japan. The Marukis entered Hiroshima a 
few days after the bombings and, unable to erase the horrifying im-
ages seared so indelibly into their minds, later painted a series of 15 
panels. In his review of the exhibit, the Washington Post’s Mark Jen-
kins described the Marukis’ “grim” paintings as “suggesting Hierony-
mus Bosch, Goya’s black paintings and Picasso’s ‘Guernica,’ as well 
as lurid renderings of hell from the less gentle-minded branches of 
Buddhism.” The early paintings, which focused on the atomic bomb 
victims, depict the nightmarish conditions the victims faced. They 
graphically portray the torment of anguished, naked people as they 
walked through the fi res of hell on earth, surrounded by corpses on 
all sides. For our exhibit, we selected two of these early paintings—
“Fire” and “Ghosts.” The exhibit also included “Floating Lanterns,” 
a beautiful rendering of the lantern ceremony held every August 6 in 
Hiroshima. Over the years, the Marukis’ vision of victimhood in the 
nuclear age grew to include more than just the Japanese living in Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki. This broadening vision was captured in the 
other paintings that we exhibited. In 1955, they painted “Petition,” 
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which captures the remarkable petition drive begun by Tokyo-area 
housewives to ban atmospheric nuclear testing in the aftermath of the 
Lucky Dragon 5 incident in 1954; “Crows,” a stark portrayal of the 
discrimination against Korean victims, whose bodies were left unat-
tended to rot in the streets as crows swooped down to pluck out their 
eyeballs; and “Death of American Prisoners of War,” which showed 
U.S. prisoners who survived the bombing only to be beaten to death 
by angry Japanese.
In addition to the Maruki panels, the American University exhibit 
included drawings that students from Hiroshima’s Honkawa Elemen-
tary School sent to Washington, DC’s All Souls Unitarian Church in 
appreciation of art supplies provided by church members in1947 and 
artifacts, photos, and other information from the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Amer-
ican University had co-sponsored an exhibit with the cities of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki 20 years earlier in 1995, displaying several of the 
artifacts that had been intended for the Smithsonian’s Enola Gay 
exhibit before it was infamously canceled under pressure from the 
American Legion, the Air Force Association, and Congressional xe-
nophobes. Cancellation of the exhibit struck fear in the hearts of cu-
rators around the country. Museums have tred lightly since then, 
rarely, if ever, risking controversial exhibits. No public museum dared 
attempt an honest atomic bomb exhibit in 2015, leaving it to three 
private institutions—American University, Boston University, and 
Pioneer Works in Red Hook, Brooklyn—to fi ll the gap.
The American University exhibit was tremendously successful in 
some ways and disappointing in others. Choosing to have it coincide 
with the August anniversaries of the atomic bombings meant that 
most students would be away for their summer breaks. Though thou-
sands of DC-area citizens and international visitors attended, it did 
not generate the kind of discussion on campus that it might have if 
classes were in session.
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The exhibit did, however, attract a considerable amount of media 
attention. As is usually the case with Hiroshima- and Nagasaki-relat-
ed events in the United States, the Japanese media turned out in force 
and covered the exhibit thoughtfully and comprehensively throughout 
its duration. Other international media were also well represented as 
the exhibit got excellent coverage not only in Japan, Russia, and 
China but in much of Europe and Latin America. During the course 
of the summer, I conducted scores of interviews—sometimes as many 
as six a day—but mainstream U.S. media did its best to ignore the 
anniversary in general and the exhibit in particular. The Associated 
Press, to its credit, wrote an excellent article that was picked up by 
many newspapers. C-SPAN did a special program. The Washington 
Post provided a thoughtful review and the Los Angeles Times a short-
er, though positive, one. But so far as mainstream media coverage, 
that was pretty much it. National Public Radio, which has become 
increasingly corporate and conservative in recent years, steered clear. 
The Pacifi ca Radio Network and other alternative media, on the other 
hand, eagerly provided coverage.
The paucity of U.S. corporate media coverage highlighted the 
broader challenge of reaching a mainstream audience with counter-
triumphalist interpretations of U.S. history. Oliver Stone and I have 
had a similar experience surrounding Untold History. Despite the book 
being on the New York Times bestseller list for weeks and the book 
and documentaries attracting effusive endorsements that began with 
Mikhail Gorbachev and soon included many of America’s leading 
scholars and also receiving rave reviews from almost all the progres-
sive media, getting treated seriously by the corporate media was an 
uphill struggle and often an exercise in futility. Exposing the history 
of the American empire and national security state was apparently too 
radical for their tastes and interests.
Japanese scholars should understand how this works. My experi-
ence with Japanese media over the years is quite similar. This was 
グローバル・コミュニケーション研究　第 3号（2016年）
110
most apparent when Oliver Stone and I did a Japanese speaking tour 
together in August 2013 after Oliver joined my students and me on 
my annual study-abroad class in Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. In 
addition to class-related activities, Oliver and I did daily public events 
and interviews. The Japanese media was happy to cover our blistering 
critique of the atomic bombings—close to 150 reporters and camera-
men showed up for our tour of the Hiroshima A-Bomb Museum—
but fell strangely silent when it came to covering our remarks about 
Japan’s failure to deal honestly and comprehensively with controver-
sial aspects of its own history. Nor did we get much traction in 
mainstream Japanese media for our visit to and comments on the 
ongoing U.S. military occupation of Okinawa or for our support for 
anti-base forces in their heroic struggle to block building a new U.S. 
marine base in environmentally pristine Henoko, despite the repeat-
edly voiced opposition of the Okinawan people.
Oliver’s participation in the 2013 Peace Tour certainly garnered an 
extraordinary amount of media attention, but, over the years, my stu-
dents and I have become accustomed to being followed around by TV 
and documentary fi lm crews and newspaper reporters because of the 
uniqueness of our program and the special message it conveys. This 
past summer we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the tour, which is 
quite special and worth refl ecting on. It is the only one of its kind in 
which students from the United States, Japan, China, Korea, Viet-
nam, Canada, the Philippines, and other nations live and study nucle-
ar history together and participate in commemorative events in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki. I began taking students in 1995 in order to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings and the 
launching of American University’s Nuclear Studies Institute to great 
fanfare because of our sponsorship of that fi rst atomic bomb exhibit. 
Ritsumeikan University Economics Professor Atsushi Fujioka, a lead-
ing scholar and renowned peace activist, helped guide that fi rst Peace 
Tour and then began bringing his own Ritsumeikan University stu-
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dents the following year. The tour has undergone dramatic changes 
over the years. We added Nagasaki to the itinerary and then branched 
out to include students from Asia Pacifi c University.
2015 was a special year. Professor Fujioka, who is in semi-retire-
ment (though he will be back with the Peace Tour again next sum-
mer), was replaced by another leading Japanese scholar/activist—
Ritsumeikan University Law Professor Akihiko Kimijima—who re-
joined us for the fi rst time since 1995 and 1996. Professor Kimijima 
has since been named chair of the faculty of International Relations 
and president of the Peace Studies Association in Japan. We were also 
joined on the faculty by Ritsumeikan Professor of International Rela-
tions Kazuyo Yamane, Montgomery College (Maryland) History 
Professor Vincent Intondi, esteemed Hibakusha Koko Tanimoto 
Kondo (daughter of Rev. Kiyoshi Tanimoto, who was instrumental in 
revitalizing Hiroshima in the days and years after the bombing), and 
Satoko Norimatsu (director of the Vancouver Peace Philosophy Cen-
tre).
In addition to the faculty, we had approximately 50 participants—
the largest group we’ve ever had—equally divided among American 
and Asian students. The turnout was particularly gratifying for the 
American side because, despite considerable interest in the program, 
the cost of airfare, tuition, and travel expenses has often kept enroll-
ment down in recent years. The small scholarship fund we’ve put 
together provides some assistance to interested students.
We’ve learned many lessons over the years about the challenges of 
nuclear education. Clearly, no places rival Hiroshima and Nagasaki for 
teaching about the history and future dangers of nuclear warfare. Both 
cities have excellent, though quite different, museums, peace parks, 
commemorative events, and special sites to help teach the lessons. 
Students routinely describe the experience as “life-changing” and 
several have participated multiple times. Many have gone on to ca-




Participants—students and non-students alike—usually report that 
meeting the Hibakusha and hearing their personal testimonies has the 
most profound impact on them. Most of the survivors who address 
our group were teenagers in August 1945. Their memories, like those 
of the Marukis, are vividly imprinted in their memories. Their ac-
counts are painful, graphic, personal, tragic, and highly emotional. 
They touch the students in a very human way.
Interestingly, though, the most powerful testimony comes from 
Koko Tanimoto Kondo, who was only eight months old at the time 
of the bombing. Koko’s story is of a different sort. She tells of grow-
ing up the daughter of the Rev. Kiyoshi Tanimoto, who was often 
absent during her childhood as he was engaged in global peacekeeping 
efforts as well as in efforts in Hiroshima, where several badly disfi g-
ured young girls attended his Methodist Church. Koko befriended 
these “big sisters” and came to internalize a deep anger toward the 
Americans responsible for their suffering. Throughout her early years, 
she fantasized about exacting revenge when she was ready. For Koko, 
that event came sooner than she anticipated when 10 year old Koko 
and her mother, brothers, and sister were summoned to the United 
States to surprise her father, who was a guest on an old television 
show “This is Your Life.” Among the other participants who honored 
Rev. Tanimoto was Enola Gay Co-captain Robert Lewis. Koko’s bit-
terness melted away as she heard Lewis describe his anguish over 
what he had done and recount the comment he wrote in the fl ight 
log—“Oh God! What have we done?” She could never forget the 
tears she saw in Lewis’s eyes that day. Later, when Koko was a stu-
dent at American University, she wanted to visit Captain Lewis, but 
never did. She later learned that he had died in an institution. His 
psychiatrist reported that he left behind a sculpture of a mushroom 
cloud and a tear. Koko also tells about coming to understand her fa-
ther and realize that his absence was more an expression of his love 
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for her than any kind of rejection. Aside from building the Hiroshima 
Peace Center and playing a central role in the city’s revitalization, he 
also spearheaded with Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins, the 
Hiroshima Maidens’ Project, which brought some of the most disfi g-
ured female Hibakusha to the United States for multiple plastic sur-
geries in 1955. Koko also shares a deeply disturbing story about her 
humiliating experience at the Atom Bomb Casualty Commission, 
which led her to swear that she would never again tell anyone that 
she came from Hiroshima. She kept that vow until her days as an 
undergraduate at American University when several students’ callous 
defense of the U.S. invasion of Vietnam so outraged her that she de-
clared that she was from Hiroshima and admonished them to con-
sider the victims, shaming them into silence.
But Koko’s story is ultimately about love, forgiveness, and recon-
ciliation. It is the emotional high point of the Peace Tour. Other 
Hibakusha share different experiences based on their own experi-
ences. Many are equally moving in their own way. No one ever for-
gets hearing of the excruciating suffering or extraordinary courage and 
resilience of 16-year old Sumiteru Taniguchi, especially after he re-
moves his shirt to show them the scars 70 years later or the original 
photos of his horrifi c burns. Taniguchi-san, who is chairman of the 
Nagasaki Council of A-Bomb Sufferers, spent four years in the hos-
pital, much of the time begging someone to put him out of his mis-
ery. The famous January 1946 photo of him lying on his stomach 
exposing his bright red back is on his business card with the caption, 
“I want you to understand, if only a little, the horror of nuclear 
weapons.” No one ever forgets the anguish of 10-year old Sakue Shi-
mohira, who fi nally found her mother’s body only to have it crumble 
into ashes in her hands or to hear of her struggle to go on living after 
her younger sister threw herself in front of a train. Shimohira-san too 
intended to throw herself in front of an oncoming train, but, at the 
last minute, changed her mind. It took courage to die, she refl ected. 
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But it also took courage to live.
Survival was incredibly diffi cult for Hibakusha, young and old, in 
the years after the bombing. There are reasons why so few Hibakusha 
discuss the 1945-50 period and what they had to do to stay alive.
There’s lots one could say about the Peace Tours. I personally fi nd 
them reenergizing in ways unlike anything else in life. But the chal-
lenge comes in trying to move students beyond the immediate human 
reaction to the gruesome accounts they’re hearing to think about the 
deeper implications of the United States’ willingness to prolong the 
war in August 1945 in order to use the atomic bombs and what that 
says about how far U.S. offi cials were willing to go to get their way 
throughout the Cold War and in its aftermath. Truman began the 
process. The Soviets, fearing, for good reason, a U.S. atomic attack 
accelerated their own research and tested their own atomic bomb in 
August 1949. In response, the U.S. upped the stakes exponentially 
and began developing a hydrogen bomb, which it tested in 1952. De-
structive capabilities reached new heights. Oppenheimer’s nightmare 
scenario was becoming reality. The Soviets responded in kind and the 
madness was on. President Eisenhower, who is mostly remembered 
for his warning about the deadly dangers of the military-industrial 
complex, was the chief architect of the insanity. When Eisenhower 
took offi ce in January 1953, the U.S. had a little more than 1,000 
nuclear bombs. When he left offi ce eight years later, that number had 
reached more than 22,000. When his budgeting cycle was completed 
in 1962, the number had climbed to 30,000. After backing down dur-
ing the Cuban Missile Crisis rather than destroy half the world or 
more, Soviet leaders determined never to again be in such a position 
of weakness. Before long, between them, the U.S. and the Soviets had 
the equivalent of more than 1.5 million Hiroshima bombs. When 
nuclear winter was later taken into account, experts realized that we 
had the capability several times over to end all life on our planet.
That tale of human folly can be taught and learned in Hiroshima 
“Who could tell us apart? Who would be left to tell us apart?”
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and Nagasaki, but it is not intrinsic to the experience in those two 
cities. As one of my students astutely pointed out several years ago, 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are about World War II. The horrors of that 
war, unparalleled in the annals of history, would pale by comparison 
with the horrors of World War III, which would likely draw the fi nal 
current down on all human and animal life. In fact, if even a small 
fraction of today’s arsenal of 16,000 nuclear weapons is used, we’ve 
had it. Recent estimates place the number of deaths from the long-
term effects of a limited war between India and Pakistan in which 
only 100 nuclear weapons were used at close to 2 billion people. That 
is the discussion that was largely missing from the 70th anniversary 
commemorative events. That is the lesson that Oliver Stone and I 
tried to convey in our Untold History. In nuclear history, there are no 
do-overs—no second chances to get things right. As Nikita Khrush-
chev, whose recklessness helped get us into the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and whose statesmanship and humanity helped get us out, astutely 
remarked to Norman Cousins, “Peace is the most important goal in 
the world. If we don’t have peace and the nuclear bombs start to fall, 
what difference will it make whether we are Communists or Catholics 
or capitalists or Chinese or Russians or Americans? Who could tell us 
apart? Who will be left to tell us apart?” Few asked that question in 
2015. But with each succeeding day, it becomes increasingly poignant 
and increasingly urgent. 
Notes
 1)  Peter Kuznick is Professor of History and Director of the Nuclear Stud-
ies Institute at American University. In 2012, he and fi lmmaker Oliver 
Stone co-authored the book and documentary fi lm series titled The Un-
told History of the United States, which aired on Showtime in the 
United States and NHK in Japan. He has been bringing students on a 
study-abroad class to Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki every summer 
since 1995.
